In this paper, we study an education-planning problem by using a mechanism design approach. We con sider a model where agents have different abilities in acquiring education and belong to different social groups (for instance, races or genders). Under the information constraint that the abilities of agents are unobservable but group memberships are observable, we derive two sets of education policies derived under Rawlsian and utilitarian social welfare functions. Our main results show that the utilitarian planner does not discriminate agents by their social group membership, while the Rawlsian planner provides a form of affirmative action policy. We also study second-best optimal education policies in the case of general degrees of inequality aversion. In this case, it is shown that affirmative action is not necessarily supported, and the differences in education levels are determined by the agents' marginal effects of util ity to their group's aggregated welfare.
Introduction
Education inequality is considered as a crucial cause of differences in wage and status, and other social inequalities. Inequalities of education are persistent across different social groups distinguished by, for instance, genders, races or parent's jobs in the forms of gaps in test scores and in school achievements. Some past studies conclude that inequalities in education among social groups arise from differences in their circumstances. For example, Fryer and Levitt (2004) argue that one cause of the observed test score gaps between blacks and whites in the U.S. may be systematically lower quality schools for blacks relative to whites. Filmer (2008) 12 kaname miyagishima insists that, in many countries, inequalities in education persist due to gender stereotyping. In these cases, an individual in a disadvantaged group may achieve a lower level of education than another individual in an advantaged group, even if both individuals exert the same level of effort in acquiring education. On this basis, Roemer (1998) , among others, insists that agents should not be held accountable for differences in backgrounds and circumstances, and that social inequalities arising from these differences should be corrected through policy.
Under these situations, in several countries including the U.S., affirmative action is imple mented to give children in disadvantaged groups preferential treatments. However, there are active discussions on whether affirmative action should be admitted or not 1 . Supporters of af firmative action argue that it helps to compensate past discrimination against minorities and to achieve more equal opportunity and student diversity. In contrast, its opponents insist that affirma tive action leads to forms of reverse discrimination such that less-qualified agents are admitted to enter universities, and results in violation of rights such as the rights to equal consideration.
In this paper, we consider, from a distributional viewpoint, what ethical principle sup ports affirmative action. Specifically, we show that a form of Rawlsian difference principle supports affirmative action, while a utilitarian principle does not.
We use an extended version of the model introduced by Fleurbaey et al. (2002) . In our model, agents differ in two respects. First, agents have different abilities relevant to their costs of acquiring education. Second, we assume that each agent belongs to one of two social groups, either A (advantaged) or D (disadvantaged). We consider the situation where because of socioeconomic and environmental factors, agents in the socially disadvantaged group tend to pay larger costs of obtaining education than those in the advantaged group 2 . Therefore, we assume that the relative proportion of agents with higher abilities in the disadvantaged group is smaller than in the advantaged group 3 .
Moreover, we consider two kinds of benefit from education. First, each agent benefits from his or her own level of education. Examples of this kind of education benefit include the en hancement of human capital and the accumulation of knowledge. Second, each agent also benefits from the average education level of society as a whole as an externality. Examples of this kind of education benefit potentially include a reduction in crime, the development of new technolo gies and knowledge, and an increase in political awareness. Although there are various forms of education externalities, we introduce education externality in a simple way in which the util ity of agents depends on the average education level of society 4 . Note that the impact of education externalities differs across countries. For instance, some researches argue that educa tion externalities are larger in developing countries than in developed countries 5 . Accordingly, in this paper, we analyze how the impact of the education externality affects the distribution of resources on education across different social groups.
We compare two sets of policies derived from utilitarian and Rawlsian social welfare func tions. When we employ the utilitarian social welfare function, there is no difference in education policy for the different groups, i.e., the optimal allocation of the level of education and school
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Education Inequality among Different Social Groups ing help depends only on the abilities of agents. In contrast, when we adopt the Rawlsian social welfare function, the result is that given the same ability level:
(i) agents in the disadvantaged group achieve a higher education level than those in the advantaged group; and (ii) agents in the disadvantaged group receive more (less, respectively) schooling help than those in the advantaged group if the impact of the education externality is sufficiently large (small, respectively).
These results imply that a Rawlsian education policy leads to a form of "discrimination" between social groups. In particular, we can interpret result (i) as a form of reverse discrimi nation in the sense that preferential treatment is given to more disadvantaged agents. This result could be interpreted that the Rawlsian principle supports affirmative action. In the area of po litical philosophy, there are some arguments on the relationship between affirmative action and Rawls' (1971) theory of justice 6 . Our results provide a new theoretical evidence on the relation ship between affirmative action and Rawls' (1971) difference principle. That is, given infor mation asymmetry about the abilities of agents, Rawls' (1971) difference principle would derive an affirmative action policy for education in the sense that agents in the disadvantaged group achieve higher levels of education than those in the advantaged group.
Our main results are based on the two polar social welfare functions, utilitarian and Rawl sian. It would be, however, important to analyze education policies derived from a social welfare function that is a compromise between the two polar functions. Hence, we study a second-best policy derived from a social welfare function with an inequality aversion between utilitarian and Rawlsian 7 . In this case, for simplicity, we focus on education level and income redistri bution. It is shown that, for the highest ability agents, the first best allocations are achieved and there is no difference in education levels between the two groups. In contrast, for the lowest ability agents, the difference in education levels between the two groups is determined by the dif ference in the marginal effects of the lowest welfare in each group: If the influence of most disad vantaged agents (with the lowest ability) in a group on the group's welfare is higher than that in the other group, then it is socially second-best optimal to let those disadvantaged agents in the former group achieve higher education than those in the latter group. This result shows that there may be cases where agents in the advantaged group achieve higher education levels than agents in the disadvantaged group. Hence, affirmative action is not necessarily supported by the social welfare functions with intermediate degrees of inequality aversion.
We introduce the related literature. There are many studies concerning the distribution of public expenditure on education. In a seminal work, Arrow (1971) considers the utilitarian approach to the problem of distributing public spending. Ulph (1977) and Hare and Ulph (1979) analyze situations where both education and income redistribution policies are simultaneously performed, using the model of asymmetric information where agents' talents are unobservable. In a similar setting, Fleurbaey et al. (2002) investigate the distribution of public spending on education (schooling help) and income transfers where the planner has a social welfare function with constant elasticity of substitution (CES)-type functions displaying various degrees of inequality aversion.
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Several existing studies also consider externalities in education. For example, Green and Sheshinski (1975) extended Arrow's (1971) model to the case where all agents benefit from the average level of education as well as their own level of education. They showed that if an education externality exists, the utilitarian social planner shifts public expenditures to high ability individuals that can use these resources most efficiently. In other work, De Fraja (2002) considered a similar type of education externality as Green and Sheshinski (1975) in constructing a mechanism for optimal education policies where incomes and the unobservable talents of chil dren differ across households. In addition, De Fraja (2002) employed a utilitarian social welfare function and his model allowed for a private education sector.
Our main contribution to the literature is that we study education differences between different social groups at second-best optimal policy. Especially, affirmative action would be an important issue in many societies in this context. Our results show a normative criterion under which affirmative action could be supported, using a model with different distributions of abilities for different social groups: Among the CES class of social welfare functions, only the Rawlsian social welfare function always supports affirmative action at second-best opti mum. Moreover, we show that under the Rawsian criterion, the magnitude of education exter nality determines which social group receives more schooling help.
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model.
In Section 3, we analyze the case where agents' talents are observable as a benchmark. In Section 4, we examine the distribution problem under incomplete information. In Section 5, we study second-best optimal education policies in the case of general degrees of inequality aversion. Section 6, provides some concluding remarks.
Model
We consider an economy where the whole population is divided into two groups, A and D.
For each j = A, D, abilities are distributed according to the distribution function F : ,
This is a standard assumption in the mechanism design literature. Let p j be the proportion of group j and p A +p D ‫א‬ = 1.
In the rest of the pap er, we refer to an agen t with ability Ʌ ‫[א‬T ,T ] and j A, D} as ‫א‬ { type Ʌ j .
We assume that group A is more advantaged than group D re Ʌ‫א‬ in the following way: the proportion of agents with higher abilities in group A is larger than in group D in the sense of verse hazard rate dominance. That is, for all ( T ,T ):
As discussed in Introduction, the agent's ability Ʌ is considered as reflecting family back ground: Lower ability agents are handicapped by their weaker family backgrounds. We also assu me that agents in the socially disadvantaged group D tend to pay larger costs of obtaining education (introduced later) than those in the advantaged group A 8 . Each agent chooses an effort level y ≥ 0 to acquire education. Schooling help, s, is an in-kind transfer provided by the government? We assume that an education production function g gives the educational achieve ment of an individual as an increasing function of effort and help. Let ,s be the edu e g y cation level (e.g. years of schooling) when exerting effort y and receiving in-kind help s (e.g. scholarship for tuition fee, or donation of books or stationeries).
Each agent's gain from education is given by B e
, E , where e is the agent's own education level, E is the average education level of society. For simplicity, we assume B e
, E e a E, where a ! 0 represents the magnitude of the education externality:
where e is type T 's education level. Note that each agent benefits not only from his or j T j her own education level, but also from the social education level as an externality.
The total effort expenditure of an agent with ability T is T y . The minimal amount of effort needed to achieve the education level while receiving s is denoted. By definition, e g C e , º { ª ,s s . Following Fleurbaey et al. (2002) , we make assumptions directly on the ¬ ¼ cost function C and its derivatives.
Assumption. The mapping C is twice continuously differentiable, with partial deriva tives satisfying:
(1) Ce > 0, Cs < 0, Ces < 0; (2) Ce ĺ 0 as e ĺ 0 for all s; Cs ĺ 0 as s ĺ +∞, and Cs ĺ −∞ as s ĺ 0 for all e; (3) C is strictly convex; (4) Cee > |Ces| and Css > |Ces|.
Together, Assumptions (1)- (4) are almost the same as Assumption 1 in Fleurbaey et al. (2002, p. 121) . Assumption (1) implies that additional education increases cost, additional help decreases cost, and additional help decreases the marginal cost of education. Assumption (2) is a condition to focus on the interior solution to ensure the simplicity of the analysis. Assumption (3) states that the returns to scale in the production of an individual level of edu cation are strictly decreasing. Assumption (4) means that the cross second-order derivative Ces is sufficiently small in absolute terms. This condition holds if education and schooling help are close substitutes.
Each agent receives a monetary transfer
t R from the public sector. t represents a scheme of income tax and support. The difference between t and s is that t is related to income 16 kaname miyagishima redistribution when agents work after their education is finished, while s is an in-kind support when agents are under education.
We assume thatT 's utility is given as
where t and s j (Ʌ) are type 's transfer and schooling help, respectively. We introduce the j T T j two social welfare functions (SWF hereafter). The utilitarian SWF is given as:
On the other hand, the Rawlsian SWF is defined as:
In the following sections, we compare the two kinds of education policies derived from these alternative SWFs.
The First-Best Problem
As a benchmark, in this section we consider the case where agents' abilities are observ able. We then compare the first-best allocations with respect to the utilitarian and Rawlsian so cial welfare functions. The problems are:
T subject to the balanced budget constraint (BB):
where M >0 is an exogenously given amount of money.
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Let ( e R , s R ) and ( e U , s U ) be the first-best solutions of the Rawlsian and utilitarian SWFs, respectively. The optimality conditions are:
where k = U, R, and , j A D . Notice that in the case of the Rawlsian SWF, all types achieve the same utility level:
Given the optimality conditions (3) and (4) are identical for both SWFs, the first-best solutions are the same. Therefore, we can put (
By (3) and (4) (ii) s C T,a is increasing (nonincreasing, respectively) in Ʌ if a < Cee Ces / Ces ( a ≥ (Cee Ces ) / Ces, respectively).
Proof. Differentiating (3) and (4) by Ʌ and solving the system of the equations, we obtain
s T T,a
Moreover, from equation (7) and (6) and Assumption (4), e C , < 0.
, 0 es 0 Proposition 1 states that (i) the higher the ability of an agent, the higher the level of educa tion he/she achieves; and (ii) if the impact of the externality a is sufficiently large (small, respectively), agents with higher abilities receive higher (lower, respectively) levels of help.
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An intuition behind the result (ii) is that if the impact of the externality is sufficiently large, then the planner has an incentive to reduce the costs of high-ability agents and so allow them to ac quire more education to increase the externality.
Next, note that the left-hand sides of equations (3) and (4) are common for the two social groups. Thus, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2.
Under complete information, the allocation of education and help is the same for the two groups A and D.
Therefore, when the planner can observe the agents' abilities, there is no discrimination with respect to education and schooling between the two social groups.
The Second-Best Problem
In this section, we analyze the case where the planner cannot observe the agents' abili ties. We introduce Incentive Compatibility (IC). We assume that each agent cannot affect the level of externality, since the population is infinitely large and hence his/her influence is neg ligible. , ] and all
This constraint means that any agent has no incentive to misreport his or her ability. Note that agents cannot lie about their group as the planner can observe each agent's group mem bership. Our problem is then to maximize the two social welfare functions subject to (BB) and (IC).
We derive the following condition (IC f ) from (IC ) 10 .
, 
C e x s x e x C e x s x s x d
T a T e T ,s T , we obtain:
Next, we discuss the second-order condition of (IC). Differentiating
twice with respect to T c (with evaluating T c = T ), we have the second-order condition as follows:
By the two conditions above, we obtain the following condition. We also rewrite (BB). From
In the remainder of our analysis, we solve the utilitarian and the Rawlsian second-best problems under the new constraints (BB'), (IC f ) and (ICs), instead of (BB) and (IC). In the next two subsections, we solve the problems by ignoring (ICs).
The Utilitarian Solution
Now we analyze the second-best utilitarian education policies. We solve
T subject to (BB' ) and (IC f ).
To solve the problem, we rewrite (BB') and (IC f ) as follows. For each j A, D , define 
p u f p
Applying Pontryagin's maximum principle, we obtain the following conditions:
From these equations, we obtain
where (e u , s u ) are the second-best utilitarian education policies.
It is obvious that equations (8) and (9) are the same as the optimality conditions under com u C C plete information, i.e., equations (3) and (4). Therefore, (e u , s ) (e , s ) . Then, given that the first-best allocation of education and help (e C , s C ) does not distinguish agents by their group membership, the same result holds for the allocation of the utilitarian education policies under incomplete information. We summarize the result as follows.
kaname miyagishima
Proposition 3. Suppose that Assumptions (1)- (4) hold. Under incomplete information, the utilitarian education policies do not discriminate between the different social groups in ],
Thus, when the planner adopts the utilitarian SWF, agents with the same ability level receive the same level of education and help, regardless of their group membership. As (e , s ) (e , s ) , we can see that (IC) does not bind. Hence, any utility levels can be achieved as long as (IC) and (BBƍ) are satisfied.
The Rawlsian Solution
We consider the second-best Rawlsian education policies. The maximization problem is:
subject to (BBƍ) and (IC f ). From (BBƍ) and (IC f ), we obtain:
Since the group memberships are observable, it is obvious that u A T D T . From this u observation, we can put the lowest utility level as u T . Then, (BB'') can be rewritten as: 
The optimality conditions (10) and (11) imply that the education and help levels of all types except T A and T D are distorted. In contrast, as F j T 0 for each j, the education and help levels of agents with the highest ability are at the first-best levels.
From Proposition 1, it is obvious that, for all T and j,
T,a ; and
a if a is sufficiently small (large, respectively).
r Moreover, if F f is increasing in T , then e r is decreasing in T and s is increasing j / j j j (nonincreasing, respectively) in T when a is sufficiently small (large, respectively).
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Now we consider the differences in the levels of education and schooling help for the two groups. Remember the assumption that for all T ,
By this assumption and Proposition 1-(i):
).
Ces respectively
In sum, we have obtained the following result. (1)- (4) hold. Then, the second-best Rawlsian policies have the following properties:
Proposition 4. Suppose that Assumptions
(a ≥ -(Cee + Ces) / Ces, respectively).
(i) implies that agents with the highest ability across the two groups are not discrimi nated against in education. That is, they obtain the same levels of education and help.
(ii) means that all agents except the highest-ability agents in the disadvantaged group achieve a higher education level than agents in the advantaged group. This could be inter preted as a form of reverse discrimination in that the more disadvantaged group is given more preferential treatment than the advantaged group.
(iii) suggests that all agents except the highest-ability agents in the disadvantaged group receive higher (lower, respectively) levels of schooling help than agents in the advantaged group whenever the degree of externality is sufficiently small (large, respectively). The mag nitude of the externality affects the difference in the level of schooling help across the two groups.
Next, we have the following corollary to Proposition 4. The Lagrangean of the problem is defined as
The optimality conditions are obtained as follows (see Leonard and Van Long, 1995, Theorems 6.5.1 and 7.11.1) . For each j,
From (iii), π 2 is constant with respect to θ.
(ii) implies 1 j 0 and
Thus, for the lowest ability agents, the difference in education levels between groups A and D is determined by the difference in the marginal effects of B A and B D in each group. Note that the marginal effects are not necessarily on the social welfare as a whole, since those marginal effects are not weighted by the probabilities. If the marginal influence of most disadvantaged agents (with the lowest ability) to the their own group's welfare is higher than that in the other group, then it is socially second-best optimal to let those disadvantaged agents in the former group achieve higher education than those in the latter group.
Thus, in the case with a general inequality aversion affirmative action is not necessarily supported even for the lowest ability agents. Rather, for some ability level, agents in the more advantaged group may achieve higher education levels.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have studied second-best optimal education policies where agents differ in ability and group membership. We have obtained the following results. First, the Rawlsian education policy leads to a form of "reverse discrimination" in the following sense: agents in the advantaged group achieve a lower level of education than agents in the disadvantaged group, and the former receive less schooling help than the latter if the impact of the external ity is sufficiently small (Proposition 4). Second, the education policies derived from the utilitarian social welfare function do not distinguish agents by their group membership (Proposition 3).
The differences in the policies arise through the incentive compatibility constraints. On the one hand, when using the utilitarian social welfare function, the constraints do not bind. Thus, the allocation coincides with the first-best allocation that does not discriminate be tween agents by their group. On the other hand, when we adopt the Rawlsian social welfare function, the incentive constraints bind. The social planner would then require that higher ability agents achieve higher levels of education and so transfer income from agents with higher abilities to those with lower abilities. Given asymmetric information, under the incen tive compatibility constraints, the planner must provide information rent
to higher-ability agents to make them exert a higher level of effort. To reduce the information rent, the planner would lower the cost of the lower-ability agents. To reduce this cost, the planner requires lower-ability agents to exert a lower effort, and thus to achieve a lower education level 
T T D s
' . Hence, the education level of type is lower than T A is lower than that of type T D . An intuition is that, as the relative proportion of agents with higher abilities in the group A is larger than in group D, the planner makes the education level of T A lower than that of T D to decrease the information rent.
Proposition 4 may be interpreted as a justification for an affirmative action policy on education. As discussed in the introduction, the result would show a relationship between affirmative action and Rawls' (1971) difference principle. We have also shown, in section 5, that when the inequality aversion of the social welfare function is between utilitarian and Rawlsian, affirmative action may not be supported as a second-best optimum. In this case, the differences in education levels between the two social groups are determined by the agents' marginal effects of utility to their group's aggregated welfare. Especially for the low est ability agents, the difference in education levels between the two groups is determined by the difference in the marginal effects of the lowest welfare in each group. As argued in foot note 7, it remains for future research to study education differences derived from Roemer's (1998) social welfare function using a model where agents' preferences may differ and they choose different effort levels.
From equations (8) and (9) Thus, we have proved that (IC s ) holds.
Notes

